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Introduction 
Individuals and organizations are continuing to increase their reliance on networks and the Internet 
(Anandarajan 2002; Cheung et al. 2000; Lim and Teo 2005). While this connectivity offers numerous 
benefits (e.g., Banker and Kauffman, 2004), it also introduces a number of threats to networked users’ 
financial and information security (Dellarocas 2005; Liang and Xue, 2009; Woon et al. 2005). Among the 
more serious of these threats is phishing; an attempt to acquire private information from victims through 
deceptive electronic communication (Jagatic et al. 2007). 
According to a Gartner Group study, e-mail phishing attacks cost individuals and businesses $3.2 billion 
in the United States alone in 2007; the same study found that 3.3 percent of all individuals who received a 
phishing email lost money as a result (Gartner 2007). (Leung and Bose 2008) showed that firms bear a 
significant portion of this cost, an idea corroborated by a 2009 industry study that found that 56 percent 
of phishing losses were absorbed by firms (Gartner 2009). Given that phishing is a relatively new 
phenomenon, it seems likely to remain an issue and potentially grow in magnitude unless measures are 
taken to ameliorate the threat (Sheng et al. 2010).  
A significant body of research has focused on training individuals to avoid phishing schemes (e.g., 
(Dhamija et al. 2006; Jagatic et al. 2007; Kumaraguru et al. 2009a; 2009b; Technologies 2009), however 
relatively little research has focused on identifying those individuals who may be more susceptible to such 
scams or the situational factors that increase susceptibility. This paper seeks to fill that gap by exploring 
personality and situational constructs that may increase the likelihood of an individual falling prey to a 
phishing attack.  
To do so, we have followed the procedure used by Wang and Benbasat (2008) in their exploratory study 
on trust in the e-commerce context. In that study, the researchers identified several potential antecedents 
of trust from the literature and then evaluated them using data collected through experimentation. For 
our research, potential antecedent constructs were identified via literature review and a Delphi-method 
study. Data were then collected from subjects via survey and an “ethical phishing” experiment; these were 
then analyzed to determine the significance of any relationships between candidate antecedents and 
phishing susceptibility. 
The results of our study provide several important contributions to IS research. Specifically, we 
demonstrate that several situational factors do, in fact, alter the effectiveness of phishing attempts. 
Further, we find that certain personality traits can impact an individual’s susceptibility to such attacks. 
This paper discusses these findings in more detail and suggests potential avenues for further research in 
this area. 
Literature Review 
The threats posed by malicious online attacks have been researched in a number of studies covering 
several contexts (e.g., (Chan et al. 2005; D'Arcy and Hovav 2007; D'Arcy et al. 2009; Galletta and Polak 
2003; Grazioli and Jarvenpaa 2000; Herath and Rao 2009a; 2009b; Johnston and Warkentin 2010; 
Kankanhalli et al. 2003; Liang and Xue 2009; Liang and Xue 2010; Siponen 2000; Siponen et al. 2006; 
Siponen and Vance 2010; Straub 1990; Straub and Goodhue 1991; Sun et al. 2006; Theoharidou et al. 
2005). However, relatively few papers have focused on phishing specifically. In the paper most similar to 
our research, Sheng et al. (2010) focused on demographic characteristics (gender, age, education level) as 
predictors of phishing susceptibility. They found that women were more susceptible to phishing than men 
and that the 18- to 25-year-olds formed the most susceptible age group. Further, they found that training 
individuals regarding common phishing practices enabled potential victims to reduce their likelihood of 
being phished. The efficacy of training materials and tools in affecting phishing susceptibility has also 
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been found in other studies (Kumaraguru et al. 2009a; 2009b) and has been the primary focus of most 
other phishing-related studies.  
In a related study study, (Jagatic et al. 2007) used an ethical phishing technique, in which a simulated, 
non-harmful phishing email is sent to experiment subjects to explore whether the gender and familiarity 
of the apparent email sender altered the recipient’s susceptibility to phishing attacks. To do this, the 
researchers scraped friend information from student subjects via a social network site, then sent 
notifications using these known friends’ identities to inform subjects that the university required subjects 
to click on a link in order to maintain certain services. Jagatic et al. found that, in addition to the majority 
of subjects being willing to provide login credentials through a “fraudulent” Web site; subjects were more 
likely to respond when the email appeared to have been sent from a known friend and were also more 
likely to respond to a message from the opposite gender. They also found that women in their study were 
more likely to click on provided links than men. This and the other existing phishing studies are 
summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1. Summary of Phishing Studies in Information Systems 
Study Objective Findings 
Dhamija et al. 
(2006) 
Examine user ability to identify authentic 
Web sites from fraudulent ones. 
Subjects performed at a 40% error rate; 
no statistically significant factor or 
method was found for identifying 
fraudulent Web sites. 
Jagatic et al. 
(2007) 
Determine whether identity and gender of 
email sender alters phishing 
susceptibility; used ethical phishing. 
Found that both the identity and gender 
of the sender matter; significant effect for 
females over males in terms of phishing 
susceptibility. 
Leung and 
Bose (2008) 
Determine whether announced phishing 
attacks by a company had a financial 
impact on firm value. 
All firms, regardless of size, showed a 
significant statistical drop in firm value 
when phishing attacks were announced. 
Kumaraguru et 
al. (2009a) 
Determine whether individuals can be 
trained to detect phishing attacks through 
a developed tool, PhishGuru. 
PhishGuru, and its underlying 
methodology, were shown to be effective 
in educating about phishing attacks. 
Kumaraguru et 
al. (2009b) 
Re-test of PhishGuru. 18-25-year-olds were most susceptible to 
phishing; PhishGuru was found to still be 
effective 28 days after training. 
Sheng et al. 
(2010) 
Examine whether gender, age and 
educational levels impact phishing 
susceptibility. 
18-25-year-olds were most susceptible to 
phishing and women were more 
susceptible than men; training reduced 
phishing susceptibility by up to 40%. 
Construct Identification 
The exploratory nature of this study dictated that we identify candidate constructs to consider as potential 
drivers of susceptibility to phishing. Initial candidates were identified through careful review of relevant 
literature in the IS field as well as the fields of psychology and communication. We reviewed articles in 
this IS security research stream that focused on online deception or fraud, and phishing in particular. 
When relevant, cited articles for constructs of interests were also reviewed to identify potentially useful 
constructs. This yielded a set of thirteen candidates, which merited further consideration.  
We then proceeded to conduct a Delphi study1. The Delphi technique enables subjects to identify and 
produce a rank-ordered list of answers to given questions posed to the group. For this study, 75 full-time 
                                                             
1 In conducting this study we followed the same methodological approach set forth in (Brancheau et al. 1996). 
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graduate students taking an “Electronic Commerce Strategies” course from a major university in the 
eastern US were recruited.  
In the first round of information solicitation, subjects were asked to identify reasons people (themselves 
or others) might either (1) click and (2) not click on links in emails that were received from both known 
and unknown apparent sources. Participants were instructed to supply their own answers to these 
questions (i.e., they were not privy to candidate constructs identified through the literature review) and to 
rank their own responses in order of importance. Following this initial round, suggested reasons were 
rank ordered based on the aggregated rankings supplied by subjects. This new, ordered list was submitted 
to the group for reordering and augmentation in two additional rounds2, ultimately resulting in a list of 
sixteen rank-ordered candidate reasons3.  
The resulting lists from both the literature review and the Delphi study were then compared. We found 
twelve constructs4 that were common between the previously identified constructs from the literature and 
the sixteen reasons for phishing described through the Delphi methodology, which we use as the basis for 
our exploratory study. As a result of this process, while not exhaustive, the set of constructs considered in 
this exploratory paper constitute an independently supported and reasonable starting point for research 
into phishing susceptibility antecedents.  
Hypothesis Development 
The twelve constructs identified can be broken into three discrete categories: message characteristics, 
personality traits, and Internet experience. Each of these categories and the constructs themselves are 
described below, along with the hypothesized effect of each construct. 
Message Characteristics 
Through our search, we found three characteristics of e-mail messages that might be expected to have an 
impact on phishing success rates: message source (i.e., the apparent sender), link type (words or 
numerals), and message content. However, we opted to control for message content as any argument or 
content in a message could be interpreted through a variety of ways in this study, that it would undermine 
the control of the study. To avoid any potentially confounding effects, we used the same message for all 
subjects. 
Message Source 
By message source, we refer to the apparent identity of the sender of the email; this variable has been 
shown to have a significant effect on the likelihood of an individual clicking on a link inside an email 
message (Jagatic et al. 2007). Accordingly, we propose that the sender of a message is an important 
predictor of phishing susceptibility due to the perceived credibility of a known source. Source credibility 
theory (Sternthal et al. 1978) proposes that individuals are more prone to believe and rely upon 
information from individuals who are perceived as credible by the recipient. Further, lacking contextual 
information regarding the expertise of a given source, the information recipient will consider a known 
source to be more credible than an unknown source (Holden and Vanhuele 1999; Sternthal et al. 1978). 
Research has long proposed and found that familiarity leads to preference, which also increases the 
likelihood of a source being able to exert influence on a recipient (Burgoon and Burgoon 2001; Petty and 
Wegener 1998). 
We propose that known sources are able to use their familiar status and thereby influence others. This 
serves as the basis for an individual trusting the content of a message apparently sent from a known party 
and thereby suspending adequate evaluation of a fraudulent phishing attack. While this finding has 
                                                             
2 In the final (third) round of the study, no additional constructs were suggested, indicating that the list had reached its stable state 
within the group of subjects. 
3 Although more reasons for phishing were identified through the Delphi method, several reasons (Specifically ones dealing with 
trust) only dealt with one construct. 
4 The Delphi study failed to show a reason for phishing that included one’s stake or involvement with the phishing subject.  
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already been reported in a related study (Jagatic et al. 2007), we seek to examine this construct along with 
the set of other variables we introduce in this study. Such an examination would enable an evaluation of 
relative strength of various antecedents. 
H1: Messages from known sources will produce higher rates of individuals clicking on 
links in phishing emails as compared to messages from unknown sources. 
Link Type 
The other message-specific variable we consider in our study is link type. By link type, we refer to the 
form of the uniform resource locator (URL) that appears in the email message. Here there are two 
options: numeric, in which an IP address is given (e.g., 103.45.3.79), and textual, in which the user sees 
the Web site’s domain name (e.g., www.google.com).  
Given that the textual form is the one most commonly seen by users, we speculate that a numeric address 
will raise a “red flag” that may alert users of a phishing email’s impropriety. Further, the textual URL 
conveys more information regarding the page to which the link points, which, we propose, engenders 
trust. Of course, the apparent URL need not be the one to which a link leads, such that in the case of a 
phishing email, such trust would be unfounded. In our study, we expect to find that a textual URL 
provides more attractive “bait” for the would-be victim. 
 H2: Messages with textual links will produce higher rates of individuals clicking on 
links in phishing emails as compared to those with numeric links. 
Personality Traits 
Our review of psychology and IS research yielded a number of personality traits that may impact an 
individual’s susceptibility to phishing attacks. Through this research as well as our Delphi study, we 
identified seven candidate personality factors to consider: trust, distrust, curiosity, entertainment drive, 
boredom proneness, lack of focus, and risk propensity. 
Trust and Distrust 
Given the prominent role that influence plays in the success of phishing attacks, trust and distrust are 
crucial constructs to be considered. Trust constitutes the willingness to be vulnerable to another and rely 
upon him or her to perform an expected behavior (Mayer et al. 1995; McKnight et al. 2002; McKnight et 
al. 1998). Distrust, on the other hand, has been defined as the unwillingness to become vulnerable to 
another given the expectation that he or she means to harm the truster (McKnight and Choudhury, 2006; 
McKnight et al. 2004). If the recipient of a phishing attack trusts the received email, he or she will rely on 
it, thus leading to vulnerability to it, thus increasing his or her likelihood of falling prey to it (Hovland and 
Weiss, 1951-1952; Petty et al. 1983; Petty and Wegener 1998; Shah and Jehn 1993; Sternthal et al. 1978).  
Trust research has proposed and found that individuals have static dispositions to both trust and distrust 
others in general (McKnight and Choudhury 2006; McKnight et al. 1998; 2002; 2004). Given the lack of 
context and actual interaction with potentially unknown attackers, a person’s innate general trusting and 
distrusting dispositions toward others in general are expected to have an effect on how the individual 
interacts. 
Recent research into trust and distrust and their reflection in brain activity has identified trust and 
distrust as discrete constructs (Dimoka 2010). Along those same lines, other research has found evidence 
that it is possible for individuals to feel trust and distrust simultaneously (Komiak and Benbasat 2008). 
While knowledge in this area is still developing, given the exploratory nature of this paper we felt it 
important to allow for this idea of trust and distrust as related, but separate, concepts. As such, trust and 
distrust are measured and analyzed as separate candidate antecedents. 
H3: Individuals with higher dispositions to trust will be more likely to click on links in 
phishing emails than those with lower dispositions to trust. 
H4: Individuals with higher dispositions to distrust will be less likely to click on links in 
phishing emails than those with lower dispositions to distrust. 
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Curiosity 
Psychological research has defined curiosity as the desire to find and attain new knowledge and be 
exposed to novel experiences that motivate exploratory behaviors (Berlyne 1949; 1950; 1954; 1957; 1958). 
This drive is considered extensively within the Big Five factors psychological literature, which includes 
culture (Tupes & Christal, 1961), intellect (Digman, 1990), or openness (McRae & John, 1992); as used in 
this study, curiosity coincides particularly well with action (the inclination to try new activities) and ideas 
(the inclination to be intellectually curious) facets of the openness construct (Costa & McRae, 1992). 
Links in email messages, especially unsolicited email messages, may appear to be an invitation to a new 
Web site that could offer new opportunities or experiences. Therefore, and given that more curious 
individuals have a heightened drive to seek novel experiences (Litman and Spielberger 2003; Lowenstein 
1994; Speilberger and Starr 1994), individuals with higher levels of curiosity may be more likely to desire 
to click on unknown links in hopes of satisfying this drive.  
H5: Individuals with higher levels of curiosity will be more likely to click on links in 
phishing emails than those with lower levels of curiosity. 
Entertainment Drive 
Psychological research has defined entertainment drive, or the need for entertainment, as the desire for 
novel sources of recreation or pleasure (Brock and Livingston 2004), which coincides nicely with the 
action factor from the Big Five (Costa & McRae, 1992). This motivation has been closely linked to curiosity 
in the literature (Litman and Spielberger 2003). Similar to curiosity, individuals with high entertainment 
drives more frequently seek novel experiences that can provide amusement or recreation. As was 
hypothesized with curiosity, this entertainment-seeking behavior may result in subjects’ desire to click on 
unknown links in hopes of attaining a new source of pleasure. 
H6: Individuals with higher levels of entertainment drive will be more likely to click on 
links in phishing emails than those with lower levels of entertainment drive. 
Boredom Proneness 
Boredom proneness refers to an individual’s disposition to feel that a current situation is uninteresting 
(Farmer and Sundberg 1986). As such, it acts as a counterpoint to entertainment drive; the latter seeks 
novel interactions and the former becomes uninterested in such interactions. Thus, building on the logic 
for entertainment drive, those with high levels of boredom proneness will tend to disengage from what 
they are currently experiencing. When presented by a new opportunity in the form of an unknown link, 
the individual will not be inherently interested in exploring it. 
H7: Individuals with higher levels of boredom proneness will be less likely to click on 
links in phishing emails than those with lower levels of boredom proneness. 
Lack of Focus 
In this study, lack of focus refers to a person’s inability to continue with a current task (Adler et al. 2006). 
Like boredom proneness, individuals with high inabilities to focus quickly move from experience to 
experience (Adler et al. 2006). This construct aligns with the self discipline facet of the conscientiousness 
construct found within the Big Five factors literature; an individual with low self-discipline is easily 
distracted (Costa & McRae, 1992). As such, when an unknown link is presented to such a person, this lack 
of focus or lack of self-discipline results in the individual breaking away from the task he or she is 
currently pursuing (e.g,, reading email) and electing to click on the link. Thus, we expect that those with 
lower abilities to focus on current tasks, such as reading one’s email, will be more likely to click on links 
that would allow them to escape the current task. 
H8: Individuals with higher lack of focus will be more likely to click on links in phishing 
emails than those with less lack of focus. 
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Risk Propensity 
Risk propensity refers to the individual’s disposition to accept uncertainty in various aspects of their lives 
and to engage in potentially risky behaviors (Nicholson et al. 2005). Research has shown that risk 
propensity is effectively opposed to trust (Mayer et al. 1995; McKnight et al. 1998; 2002). Given the 
inclusion of trust in this study, it makes sense to also include risk propensity. In operationalizing this 
construct, we have elected to also look at various types of risk, including measures of propensity for taking 
risk in regards to recreation, health, career, finances, safety, and social decision-making settings. 
Individuals who are inherently more willing to take risks are expected to be more willing to engage in 
risky behaviors online such as clicking on unknown links in emails.  
H9: Individuals with higher risk propensity will be more likely to click on links in 
phishing emails than those with lower risk propensity. 
Internet Experience 
Besides personality factors, experience with the Internet is likely to serve as a potentially viable proxy for 
the expertise and experience that an individual may have accrued through Internet usage, with the 
assumption that such experience would inculcate the individual against falling prey to phishing attacks. 
The literature review and Delphi study led to the identification of three experience-related constructs: 
general Internet usage, Internet community identification, and Internet anxiety. 
General Internet Usage 
General Internet usage refers to the cumulative amount of time that an individual spends online across a 
wide array of available activities (Joiner et al. 2007; McKnight et al. 2002). Past research suggests that 
those who are more experienced in online activities are more likely to avoid shopping online due to 
perceived security concerns (Hoffman et al. 1999). Our expectation, then, is that a similar phenomenon 
will reveal itself within the email context and that an individual with greater online experience will have 
an increased understanding of potential online risks, and therefore, will be less likely to click on unknown 
links. This understanding is likely to stem from a higher likelihood of previous experiences or browsing 
that uncovered warnings or discussions about these schemes. We thus expect that one’s experience on the 
Internet leads them to adopt some level of expertise that would allow them to identify potential phishing 
attempts, and thereby avoid such attacks. 
H10: Individuals with a higher level of general Internet usage will be less likely to click 
on links in phishing emails than those with lower levels of general Internet usage. 
Internet Community Identification 
In this study, Internet community identification expresses the level of attachment between the individual 
and the Internet (Joiner et al. 2007). An individual with a higher level of Internet community attachment 
considers himself to be a part of an online community (Joiner et al. 2005) and, as such, is likely to rely 
more heavily on the Internet (Joiner et al. 2007). Given this higher level of online association, it’s 
expected that an individual with higher Internet community identification would be more likely to click on 
an unknown link, since he may perceive that doing so may assist in deepening his online social 
interactions. 
H11: Individuals with a higher level of Internet community identification will be more 
likely to click on links in phishing emails than those with lower levels of Internet 
community identification. 
Internet Anxiety 
The construct of Internet anxiety reflects the user’s general feeling of unease or apprehension toward the 
online environment. Unlike the previous two constructs, Internet anxiety creates a strong desire to avoid 
using the Internet or to mitigate one’s exposure to it (Joiner et al. 2007). It has been found that such 
anxiety toward IT results in a significant decrease in a user’s willingness to trust a system (Hwang & Kim, 
2007) as well as users’ perception of a system’s usability (Hackbarth et al., 2003; Cowan et al., 2008). 
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Similarly, then, we expect that higher levels of such anxiety will result in a lower probability of a user 
clicking on an unknown link, due to the decreased level of trust felt towards the Internet and a perception 
that the Internet is difficult to use. Both of these perceptions will decrease the likelihood of individuals 
extending their usage of the Internet by exploring an unexpected and unknown link. 
H12: Individuals with a higher level of Internet anxiety will be less likely to click on links 
in phishing emails than those with lower levels of Internet anxiety. 
Summary of Hypotheses 
The twelve hypotheses considered in this paper are summarized in Table 2. 
Table 2. Summary of Hypotheses 
# Construct Expectation 
1 Known source of email Higher susceptibility 
2 Text-based link Higher susceptibility 
3 Disposition to trust Higher susceptibility 
4 Disposition to distrust Lower susceptibility 
5 Curiosity Higher susceptibility 
6 Entertainment drive Higher susceptibility 
7 Boredom proneness Lower susceptibility 
8 Lack of focus Higher susceptibility 
9 Risk propensity Higher susceptibility 
10 General Internet usage Lower susceptibility 
11 Internet community identification Higher susceptibility 
12 Internet anxiety Lower susceptibility 
Methodology 
To more strongly infer causality between constructs and individuals’ susceptibility to phishing scams, an 
experiment was conducted. For this experiment, 632 undergraduate psychology and information systems 
students were recruited from a large public university in the eastern US. Subjects were offered extra credit 
in their courses in return for their participation. Of these subjects, 53 percent were male and 44 percent 
were female (the other 3 percent declined to state gender). Mean age of subjects was 20.5 years (st. dev. 
2.4 years) with subjects having completed a mean of 4.5 semesters of college (st. dev. 2.3 semesters). 
Thirty-seven subjects were removed from the pool due to missing data, resulting in a final dataset sample 
size of 595. 
Design and Procedures 
The IRB-approved study consisted of a randomized 2 x 2 online experiment (known vs. unknown 
apparent email source x text link vs. numeric link). Subjects were directed to an online survey engine, 
then completed various instruments to collect the required stable personality traits used in the study as 
well as their email addresses. Subjects were then thanked for their participation then were led to believe 
that the experiment had ended (it had not). 
Two weeks later, all subjects received a plain-text email that exhibited one of four treatments 
corresponding to the four cells of the 2x2 design (subjects were randomly assigned to each treatment). 
Emails appeared to have been sent by either a known source, an individual with whom subjects had 
interacted in signing up for the experiment, or an unknown source (a co-author of this study, from 
another school, who was unknown to the subjects). To avoid confounding effects that could be introduced 
by the message, we used a very simple email message. The subject line for all treatments was “Check this 
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out” in the same fashion as Jagatic et al. (2007). The body of the email message consisted of the same text 
“Check this out:”, the remainder of the message then contained a link for the subject to click on. Subjects 
were presented with a link to an external Web site that was either shown as a 1) text-based URL or as 2) a 
numeric IP address. 
We tested the messages to make sure the University’s spam filter did not prevent the messages from being 
delivered. After several trials, we found how to set up the messages and what approach and software to 
use to mail them, to ensure delivery. 
As with any other email, subjects receiving the experimental treatment email had the option to click on 
the link or not click on it. All links were encoded with a personalized id in order to identify subjects 
uniquely. Thus, when a subject clicked on a link, the server captured the identification and stored it in a 
log, from which it could later be matched to the data given by the subject in the survey portion of the 
experiment. 
Measures 
Dependent Variable 
Susceptibility to phishing was measured on a binary scale. Subjects were scored 1 if they clicked on the 
link in the email or 0 if they did not click on the link. 
Treatments 
Email source was encoded as a binary variable with the apparent known source coded as 1 and the 
apparent unknown source coded 0. 
Source link was also encoded as a binary variable. The text link was coded 1 and the numeric IP address 
link was coded 0.  
Independent Variables 
Disposition to trust was measured using a version of the trusting beliefs instrument developed by 
McKnight et al. (2002). Due to the exploratory nature of this research, each sub-construct (i.e., 
benevolence, competence, integrity, and trusting stance) was instantiated, but the general second-order 
construct of disposition to trust was not formed as we thought it useful to explore the effect of each sub-
construct on susceptibility to phishing separately.  
Disposition to distrust was, similar to the disposition to trust construct, measured using an instrument 
developed by McKnight et al. (2003). As with disposition to trust, the second-order construct was left out 
of the model in favor of the individual sub-constructs (i.e., malevolence, incompetence, deceit and 
distrusting stance). 
Curiosity was measured along two aspects: diversive and specific. Previous instruments developed to 
measure epistemic curiosity have used this same approach and thus we follow established precedent 
(Litman and Spielberger 2003) by using both measures. 
Entertainment drive was measured using a previously developed instrument (Brock and Livingston 
2004). Several questions from the original instrument were not utilized in this study due to poor loadings 
found in the instrument’s original explication. 
Boredom proneness was measured using a previously validated instrument (Farmer and Sundberg 1986).  
Lack of focus was measured using a previously validated instrument (Adler et al. 2006), available in both 
an extensive and short-version for determining the ability of an individual to focus. We opted to use the 
shorter version of the scale, rather than the very long instrument, given the need to measure so many 
other constructs. 
Risk propensity was measured by using the risk propensity scale developed by Nicholson et al. (2005). 
This scale delineates risk propensity as different propensities within various facets of life: recreational, 
health, career, financial, safety and social risks. In addition, a measure of risk beliefs was taken based on 
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the scale developed by Malhotra et al. (2004), which specifically measures the perceived risk inherent 
within the Internet.  
General Internet usage was measured using a previously validated instrument, specific for this type of 
study (McKnight et al. 2002). 
Internet community identification was measured based on the conceptualization of Joiner et al. (2007), 
which considered two types of Internet identification: with the Internet community at large and with 
other Internet users. We followed this conceptualization and measured both types of identification 
through previously established instruments (Joiner et al. 2007). 
Internet anxiety was likewise measured using a previously established instrument (Joiner et al. 2007).  
Control Variables 
In addition, subjects’ age, level of education, and gender were gathered for consideration as control 
variables. 
Factor Analysis 
All reflective items were entered into a confirmatory factor analysis. From this, only factors with an 
eigenvalue equal to or greater than 1.0 were retained. Results were then rotated to ascertain the loadings 
of each indicator on its respective construct5. Only highly loading items were used in construct calculation 
(i.e., >.70, representing that over 50% of the variance was captured for the indicator in the rotation). 
Based on these factor groupings, the Cronbach’s alpha score for each construct was obtained to 
demonstrate construct validity. Results are shown in Table 3.  
Table 3. Construct Validity 
Grouping Construct Subconstruct (# of items) Cronbach’s Alpha 
Disposition to trust Benevolence (2) .738 
 Competence (3) .852 
 Integrity (2) .763 
 Trusting stance (3) .853 
Disposition to distrust Malevolence (3) .786 
 Incompetence (3) .861 
 Deceit (2) .692 
 Distrusting stance (4) .813 
Curiosity Epistemic curiosity (diversive) 
(5) .876 
 Epistemic curiosity (state) (3) .748 
 Perpetual curiosity (7) .830 
Boredom proneness (4) n/a .520 
Entertainment drive (5) n/a .834 
Focus (2) n/a .705 
Personality 
traits 
Risk propensity Recreational (2) .824 
                                                             
5 These results are available from the authors upon request 
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 Health (2) .831 
 Career (2) .800 
 Financial (2) .838 
 Safety (2) .876 
 Social (2) .872 
Risk beliefs (5) n/a .881 
General Internet usage 
(2) 
n/a 
.653 
Internet anxiety (2) n/a .681 
Internet 
experience 
Internet identification 
(3) 
n/a 
.891 
 
All constructs were formed based on the loadings from the rotated factor analysis (Aiken and West, 1991; 
Rossi and Anderson, 1982; Weinberg and Abramowitz, 2008)6. 
Analysis and Results 
An overall descriptive view of the results among the four treatment conditions is shown in Table 4. We 
found that 41.3% of subjects clicked on the enclosed links in the unsolicited emails.  
Table 4. Summary of Phishing Results by Treatment Conditions 
 Known sender Unknown sender 
Behavior Text link Numeric link Text link Numeric link 
Total 
Did not 
click  
68 (11.4%) 68 (11.4%) 111 (18.7%) 102 (17.1%) 349 (58.7%) 
Clicked 85 (14.3%) 51 (8.6%) 58 (9.7%) 52 (8.7%) 246 (41.3%) 
Total 153 (25.7%) 119 (20.0%) 169 (28.4%) 154 (25.8%) 595 (100%) 
 
Given the binary nature of the dependent variable, data were analyzed using multiple logistic regression 
models using STATA (v. 10.1). The first model reports the effects of the control variables on phishing 
susceptibility. The second model includes the treatment conditions in order to analyze the partial effect 
they have on the dependent variable. The last model includes all variables (See Table 5). 
We then performed the same model analyses by treatment conditions in order to ascertain the effect that 
each variable had on phishing, while controlling for the type of treatment being experienced by the subject 
(See Table 6). 
Table 5. Summary of Phishing Results for Partial and Full Models 
 Baseline model Treatment model Full model 
Construct Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p 
Age 0.065 0.146 0.066 0.154 0.075 0.122 
Educ -0.203 0.000 -0.216 0.000 -0.203 0.000 
Gender -0.213 0.218 -0.190 0.281 -0.181 0.391 
Known source   0.689 0.000 0.712 0.000 
                                                             
6 For example, the value for the sub-construct “competence” would be equal to c1 * .775 + c2 * .920 + c3 * .883. 
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Text link   0.312 0.074 0.381 0.042 
Benevolence     0.057 0.643 
Competence     -0.141 0.282 
Integrity     0.120 0.362 
Trusting stance     0.077 0.465 
Malevolence     -0.085 0.433 
Incompetence     0.013 0.912 
Deceit     0.161 0.131 
Distrusting stance     -0.138 0.236 
Boredom proneness     1.023 0.068 
Entertainment drive     0.051 0.588 
Epistemic curiosity-diversive     0.056 0.787 
Perpetual curiosity     0.005 0.983 
Epistemic curiosity-state     0.028 0.867 
Focus     -0.139 0.390 
RP-recreational     0.100 0.376 
RP-health     0.076 0.438 
RP-career     0.050 0.751 
RP-financial     -0.365 0.011 
RP-safety     0.188 0.093 
RP-social     0.051 0.652 
Risk beliefs     0.164 0.010 
General Internet usage     0.423 0.002 
Internet anxiety     -0.120 0.455 
Internet identification     -0.131 0.010 
Constant -0.452 0.592 -0.937 0.286 -2.992 0.033 
 
LR Chi2  22.790  42.490  93.150 
Prob > Chi2  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Pseudo R2  0.028  0.053  0.115 
 
Table 6. Summary of Phishing Results by Treatment Conditions 
 Unknown source Known source Numeric link Text link 
Construct Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p Coef. p 
Age 0.110 0.186 0.098 0.120 0.101 0.120 0.072 0.357 
Educ -0.185 0.015 -0.264 0.001 -0.374 0.000 -0.109 0.150 
Gender 0.036 0.904 -0.405 0.247 -0.236 0.490 -0.207 0.477 
Known source na na na na 0.527 0.085 0.925 0.000 
Text link 0.098 0.707 0.729 0.016 na na na na 
Benevolence 0.246 0.145 -0.219 0.292 -0.043 0.830 0.154 0.363 
Competence 0.000 1.000 -0.363 0.097 -0.174 0.425 -0.093 0.607 
Integrity -0.129 0.493 0.536 0.016 0.115 0.604 0.037 0.838 
Trusting stance 0.106 0.466 -0.019 0.911 -0.214 0.222 0.175 0.243 
Malevolence 0.067 0.661 -0.282 0.113 0.218 0.224 -0.275 0.077 
Incompetence -0.028 0.865 0.181 0.375 -0.134 0.476 0.120 0.492 
Deceit 0.006 0.966 0.408 0.026 0.050 0.781 0.311 0.038 
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Distrusting stance -0.212 0.175 -0.088 0.658 0.162 0.407 -0.358 0.026 
Boredom proneness 0.662 0.412 1.435 0.114 1.203 0.239 1.026 0.154 
Entertainment drive 0.167 0.229 -0.120 0.421 0.054 0.730 0.057 0.658 
Epistemic curiosity-diversive -0.076 0.790 0.233 0.491 0.391 0.293 -0.230 0.391 
Perpetual curiosity -0.165 0.583 0.109 0.773 0.127 0.742 -0.003 0.991 
Epistemic curiosity-state 0.189 0.431 -0.112 0.676 0.021 0.936 0.046 0.848 
Focus 0.205 0.364 -0.654 0.018 -0.137 0.618 -0.126 0.573 
RP-recreational 0.016 0.918 0.228 0.219 0.300 0.111 0.048 0.758 
RP-health -0.024 0.869 0.167 0.266 0.228 0.141 -0.025 0.864 
RP-career 0.031 0.883 0.090 0.736 0.194 0.470 0.052 0.815 
RP-financial -0.279 0.179 -0.576 0.010 -0.627 0.017 -0.372 0.055 
RP-safety 0.121 0.453 0.288 0.105 0.240 0.192 0.117 0.449 
RP-social 0.081 0.605 -0.024 0.895 0.100 0.609 0.094 0.536 
Risk beliefs 0.072 0.426 0.275 0.007 0.177 0.086 0.153 0.083 
General Internet usage 0.249 0.203 0.857 0.001 0.218 0.391 0.551 0.003 
Internet anxiety -0.016 0.934 -0.269 0.374 0.234 0.323 -0.560 0.027 
Internet identification -0.203 0.005 -0.086 0.304 -0.289 0.000 -0.034 0.633 
Constant -3.928 0.085 -2.104 0.291 -3.926 0.074 -1.705 0.409 
 
n  323  272  273  322 
LR Chi2  33.660  78.390  73.870  53.380 
Prob > Chi2  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.003 
Pseudo R2  0.212  0.208  0.204  0.121 
Discussion 
Findings 
The main objective of this study was to determine the message, personality traits, and Internet-related 
variables that are related to the likelihood that an individual would be susceptible for phishing by clicking 
on links in unsolicited e-mails. We found and measured several variables that can increase one’s 
propensity for phishing. We analyzed these results at several levels of analysis (basic, treatment level and 
full model) and found several general predictors that we discuss here by theoretical framework. 
Trust 
Although no measure of trust or distrust was statistically significant as a main effect in predicting the 
susceptibility for phishing, further analysis revealed several interesting findings. First, as expected we find 
that trust will most likely have an effect on phishing susceptibility when the truster knows the trustee. 
Specifically, when the source of the e-mail is known by the truster to have integrity or a lack of deceitful 
intentions, than the truster will be more likely to click on e-mailed links. This result is more pronounced 
when the link is textually based, rather than a numeric link, which reverses this effect. 
Second, we also find that it is likely for the truster to attribute distrusting attributes to unknown sources 
of e-mails, which reduces the likelihood of clicking on enclosed links. However, we note two exceptions. 
First, it is also possible that the truster attributes the unknown source of an unsolicited e-mail with 
benevolent intentions and will have an increased likelihood of clicking on a link when it is textual. Second, 
we also note an unexpected finding in that if the truster believes that the unknown sender of an e-mail is 
being deceitful, the truster has an increased likelihood of clicking on the link. Perhaps this increased 
likelihood of clicking on such links is to discover the intentions of this unknown sender, and how they 
attempt to trick the truster. 
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In summary, we find that trust tends to have an important effect on phishing susceptibility. It tends to 
increasing one’s susceptibility when the sender of the e-mail is known, and to reduce this tendency when 
the sender is unknown and attributed to be deceitful. 
Personality Traits 
Surprisingly, we find few instances where personality traits showed an effect on phishing susceptibility, 
contrary to our predictions. We find that when individuals are unable to focus, they are less likely to click 
on e-mailed links from known sources. E-mail recipients with a tendency to not focus on given tasks may 
have increased tendencies to avoid e-mailed links given that they recognized the source and thereby have 
less incentive to attend to such a message. However, such a tendency to attend to messages from unknown 
sources was not found to be significant.  
In summary, despite the expected effect of personality traits on phishing susceptibility, it produced no 
general effects, excluding two rather specific, yet powerful effects. 
Internet Experience 
The recipient’s experience with the Internet was the most predictive grouping of variables tested in all of 
our models. We report two general, yet contradictory results. The more that the recipient used the 
Internet, the more likely he or she was to click on links in unsolicited e-mails. This likely occurred due to 
previous experience with such e-mails and the belief that the recipient will continue to avoid potential 
negative consequences in the future by continuing to engage in this risky behavior. However, a smaller 
negative effect on phishing susceptibility occurred when the individual strongly identified with the 
Internet: The more time that an individual spends on the Internet, the more likely that he or she will 
acquire expertise with threats or information about Internet threats and be better equipped to identify 
potential those threats and attacks.  
In summary, the individual’s experience with and attachment to the Internet were the two most important 
collection of factors in determining phishing susceptibility. Generally, individuals who are very frequent 
users of the Internet were more likely to click on links in e-mails, while individuals who have anxiety 
towards the Internet or who are strongly identified with other Internet users were less likely to click on 
the links. 
Risk Tendencies 
Our results revealed two consistent findings. First, individuals who are prone to engage in financial risks 
are less susceptible to phishing; this effect is present when the source of the e-mail is known, or contains a 
numeric link. Given that victims of phishing attempts often have their identities stolen, which could harm 
their finances, this finding is unsurprising. It is surprising to note that no further risk propensities 
produced a similar effect. 
Special consideration must be given to the very unexpected finding that individuals who believe clicking 
on links in e-mails to be risky are also more prone to engage in such behaviors. This is found as a main 
effect, in regards to known sources only. We believe that such a finding can be explained by the 
psychological tendency to underestimate the possibility for negative consequences to occur for one’s self 
and instead overestimate its effect for others, often called an optimistic or self-serving bias (Dhamija et al. 
2006; Rhee et al. 2005).  
In summary, we have both expected and unexpected findings with regard to risk tendencies. Rather than 
finding support for several risk propensities reducing one’s phishing susceptibility, we find that only the 
financial risk tendency produces statistically significant results that reduce phishing susceptibility. 
However, we find that individuals are also falling prey to a self-serving bias in believing that they are more 
likely to identify phishing attempts and thereby may fall prey to actual phishing attempts, that they 
inappropriately believe to be legitimate communications. 
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Demographics and Manipulations 
We further report that, contrary to previous studies (Jagatic et al. 2007; Kumaraguru et al. 2009a; Sheng 
et al. 2010), gender was not a statistically significant predictor of phishing in this study. Perhaps, given 
that this study regarded a variety of predictors and used e-mail as its phishing attempt, it systematically 
differs from these previous studies. Given the ubiquitous use of e-mail, perhaps it should be expected that 
both genders have been equally, and highly exposed to multiple phishing attempts and are thus equally 
prepared to identify and prevent phishing attempts. We also note a similar lack of results for age, which 
contradicts previous studies (Kumaraguru et al. 2009a; Sheng et al. 2010). Similar to gender, this lack of 
results may also be due to the ubiquitous nature of e-mail. 
We did find that the level of education served as a strong deterrent of phishing. This effect was predictable 
and held for most models. 
Most importantly, we find that our manipulations were very strong antecedents for phishing. Specifically, 
by sending a message from a known source, it is more likely that the recipient will fall prey to the phishing 
attempt. As expected, familiarity with the source generated enough trust that the recipients relied upon 
this relationship and were more likely to be phished. As expected, making the link more understandable 
and familiar to the recipient increased the likelihood of being phished. 
Implications for Research 
This study makes several contributions to the research on phishing. First, this is the first such large-scale 
study that focuses on several theoretical foundations to determine their effect on individuals’ 
susceptibility towards phishing. By further explicating and testing these theories, we show which 
dimensions serve as accurate and reliable predictors of phishing susceptibility.  
In particular, we show that the most important indicators regarding an individual’s stable predictors of 
phishing susceptibility are determined by their previous experiences with the Internet. Namely, we find 
that frequent users of the Internet are also more susceptible to phishing. This effect is also offset by the 
individuals’ anxiety towards the Internet or their identification with other users of the Internet. These 
findings highlight that individuals who use the Internet on a frequent basis will likely increase their 
susceptibility for hacking, beyond the number of attempts that they experience.  
Further, the results are surprising in that they indicate the relatively ineffective power of personality traits 
and even trust in determining phishing susceptibility. Contrary to the strong theoretical bases that such 
individual differences variables should matter for phishing, our study indicates that very few of these 
variables are significant. It is possible that other personality traits would show better predictive power. 
Future research could determine whether security orientation, risk aversion, computer self-efficacy, etc. 
have predictive ability in regards to phishing susceptibility. Special attention should be given to non-static 
personality traits in future research as potential areas that researchers and managers could focus on to 
reduce the level of phishing susceptibility in at-risk individuals.  
We also demonstrate that individuals operate under an optimistic bias regarding their own susceptibilities 
towards phishing. Specifically, they believe that given phishing behaviors are dangerous, however when 
attacked with such a behavior, they fall prey to it. The overconfidence in identifying actual phishing 
attempts causes the recipients of such attacks to have accurate beliefs, but belie them with their overly 
optimistic behaviors. 
Lastly, we demonstrate that financial risk propensities as the only significant deterrent of phishing 
susceptibility. Although we expected that other risk propensities would also deter phishing 
susceptibilities, only the financial risk propensity produced such results. This indicates the importance of 
financial risk inherent in phishing attacks that can successfully alert phishing susceptibilities.  
Implications for Practice 
Our results indicate several ways in which individuals’ susceptibilities for phishing can be successfully 
altered to encourage safer behaviors and practices. First, given that the manipulations of the source and 
type of link were very consistent in producing increasing susceptibility for phishing, training programs 
can be created to focus on identifying and increasing individuals’ awareness of such situations. Namely, 
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technical authentications (e.g., private and public key encryption, digital signatures and e-mail filter 
protocols) can increase the abilities of e-mail users to identify and verify the actual identities of those 
sending messages that may or may not be phishing attempts. Further, by educating individuals about the 
dangers of relying on textual links, it would be further possible to avoid clicking on such links. However, 
even with education, individuals would still be overconfident in their abilities and thus fall prey to 
phishing attempts that they fail to identify, but this overconfidence could be limited through the use of 
education (Alba and Hutchinson 2000). 
Second, by increasing the focus and direction of phishing education campaigns on the risk to finances, the 
natural risk propensities towards financial loss should also reduce the general susceptibility for phishing.  
Third, educational campaigns should be directed towards the frequent usage of the Internet and the 
inherent danger that it has towards phishing susceptibility. Increased usage of the Internet will lead to 
greater likelihood that individuals will be confronted with numerous phishing attacks, which in turn 
increases their likelihood to fall prey to phishing attempts. Further, our results indicated that increased 
usage of the Internet is related to an increased susceptibility to phishing. Educating individuals about this 
danger may help to educate them and thereby avoid phishing attempts.  
It is also possible that individuals with high Internet use, risk propensities, or boredom proneness can be 
the ones identified and equipped with tools that will provide warnings or block the links in phishing 
messages. An extra step might be required that could prevent loss. 
Finally, given that the largest effect size in the model is related to individuals with boredom proneness 
and numeric links from known individuals, special education or advertising campaigns should be made to 
alert individuals with such a tendency towards boredom. In particular, they should be informed of the 
propensity of phishing attacks to include suspicious URL addresses as links. 
Conclusion 
Individuals and organizations are very reliant on the Internet (Anandarajan 2002; Cheung et al. 2000; 
Lim and Teo 2005), despite the everyday risks of phishing attacks. This papers explores several constructs 
from IS, psychology and communication research streams to explain why certain individuals are more 
prone to phishing attacks than others. Our experimental results indicate that several of these constructs 
are important predictors of phishing success. These findings provide important insights for future 
research and practice focused on reducing the threat posed by phishing. 
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